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Wednesday, November 11, 2009

Orange County: Foreclosure Notices Hit Record High

by Calculated Risk on 11/11/2009 08:47:00 AM

Matt Padilla at the O.C. Register writes: Foreclosure notices hit record 8,800

Foreclosure Notices Click on graph for larger image in new window.

Graph from O.C. Register.

ForeclosureRadar.com reports that outstanding foreclosure auction notices in Orange County rose to 8,895 at the end of September, the highest in this housing downturn and probably the highest ever.

September’s total was up 5% from August and 90% from a year ago.
Padilla provides a second graph (see his article) of 90 day delinquencies, foreclosures and REOs. He writes:
[The second] chart shows that the ratio of borrowers having missed at least three monthly payments is at nearly 7% and has risen every month for more than three years.

It’s incredible that while so many mortgages are delinquent, banks are only holding 0.26% of first mortgages as REOs.
Loans in the trial modification period are still considered delinquent, so that might explain some of the increase in 90+ day delinquencies. But that doesn't explain the continuing surge in foreclosure notices.

Tuesday, November 10, 2009

California Controller: Overview of the Commercial Property Markets

by Calculated Risk on 11/10/2009 10:23:00 PM

Buried in the California Controller's November analysis is a guest article: Overview of the Commercial Property and Capital Markets with Implications for the State of California by Dr. Randall Zisler. (ht picosec)

Here are some excerpts:

Whereas excessive and imprudent leverage fed the bubble, deleveraging not only popped the bubble, but, in the process, destroyed record amounts of equity and debt. Most deals financed with high leverage from 2005 to the present are under water. The equity is gone and the debt, if it trades at all, trades at a deep discount to face value. Most leveraged equity invested in real estate has evaporated since property prices, if marked to market, have fallen 30% to 50%.
Property Returns Click on graph for larger image in new window.

The chart [right] shows overall U.S. property total returns, quarterly (at annual rates) and lagging four quarters. This appraisal-based, lagging index shows sharp negative returns exceeding the deterioration of the RTC (Resolution Trust Corp.)
period of the early 1990s. (See Chart 1.) Second quarter 2009 returns indicate the possibility that total returns, while still negative, may have hit a point of inflection. We expect that property values in many sectors, especially office, retail, and industrial, will likely deteriorate further in 2010 with improvement beginning sometime in 2011.
...
A crisis of unprecedented proportions is approaching. Of the $3 trillion of outstanding mortgage debt, $1.4 trillion is scheduled to mature in four years. We estimate another $500 billion to $750 billion of unscheduled maturities (i.e., defaults). Unfortunately, traditional lenders of consequence are practically out of the market and massive amounts of maturing debt will not easily find refinancing. Marking-to-market outstanding debt will render many banks, especially regional and community banks, insolvent, especially as much of the debt is likely worth about 50% of par, or less.

The inability of many banks and other capital sources to lend not just to real estate firms but to other businesses in the State as well presents a real challenge to the private sector and state and local governments.
The author points out that many local and regional banks will fail because of CRE loans.

FDIC Chairwoman Sheila Bair said today: "We do obviously have a lot more banks that will close this year and next," Bair said, adding the failures "will peak next year and then subside."

These bad loans are also limiting lending to small businesses. Atlanta Fed President Dennis Lockhart made the same argument this morning:
I am concerned about the potential impact of CRE on the broader economy ... there could be an impact resulting from small banks' impaired ability to support the small business sector—a sector I expect will be critically important to job creation.
...
Many small businesses rely on these smaller banks for credit. Small banks account for almost half of all small business loans (loans under $1 million). Moreover, small firms' reliance on banks with heavy CRE exposure is substantial. Banks with the highest CRE exposure (CRE loan books that are more than three times their tier 1 capital) account for almost 40 percent of all small business loans.

Fed's Fisher: Suboptimal Growth in 2010, "Perhaps" 2011

by Calculated Risk on 11/10/2009 07:39:00 PM

"[L]ooking into 2010 and perhaps to 2011, the most likely outcome is for growth to be suboptimal, unemployment to remain a vexing problem and inflation to remain subdued."
Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher
And a little more Fed Speak ... (note: Fisher's speeches are always colorful).

From Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher: The Current State of the Economy and a Look to the Future
Now, I’ve often thought that economic forecasters seem to be cursed—or maybe blessed, I suppose, dependent upon your point-of-view—with a short-term memory: They tend to extrapolate only the most recent trends into the future. As if goosed by the more optimistic tone of the latest GDP release, many now believe that solid output growth will extend into the first half of next year. The latest Blue Chip survey, for example, shows that professional forecasters expect GDP growth averaging 2.8 percent in the first half of 2010.

I am wary of the consensus view. For a good while now, I’ve suggested that we are more likely to see a more uneven recovery—not a “V”-shaped recovery but something more akin to a check mark, where the elongated arm of that check mark inclines at a slope that is less than desirable and might possibly be repressed by an occasional pause or several quarters of weak growth.

Why a check mark?

Several recent sources of strength are likely to wane as we head into next year. Cash-for-clunkers and the first-time-homebuyer tax credit have both shifted demand forward, increasing sales today at the expense of sales tomorrow. Neither of these programs can be repeated with any real hope of achieving anywhere near the same effect: The more demand you steal from the future, the less future demand there is for you to steal. The general tax cuts and government spending increases included in this year’s fiscal stimulus package won’t have their peak impact on the level of GDP until sometime in 2010, but their peak impact on the growth of GDP has come and gone; the fiscal stimulus continues to drive GDP upward, compared with what it would otherwise have been, but the increments to GDP are beginning to shrink. And, as we all know, the shot in the arm that our economy is receiving from inventory adjustments is, while welcome, inherently transitory.

What about growth in the longer term—the second half of 2010 and beyond? American households have finally come to realize that they’ve been playing the part of the grasshopper in Aesop’s fable: They see that our previous spending boom was financed by somewhat reckless disregard for tomorrow by over-eager creditors feeding their desire for unsustainable leveraging of their income and balance sheets and, for the nation as a whole, by increases in overseas borrowing. That reality has been largely absorbed, and consumer spending is growing again—albeit from a lower base and at a slower pace. I doubt it will recover its previous vigor for some time to come. I expect that the strong bounce-back in consumer demand that we’ve come to expect in recoveries past will be absent this time around as Americans recalibrate the proportion of their income and wealth that they need to save versus what they need to consume. We need not become a nation as parsimonious as William Miles, but we are going to have to be more ant- than grasshopper-like in our behavior.[4]
...
It may be some time before significant job growth occurs and even longer before we see meaningful declines in the unemployment rate.
emphasis added
And Fisher is usually one of the more optimistic Fed presidents.

Loan Modifications: Key Numbers not Released

by Calculated Risk on 11/10/2009 03:17:00 PM

From Reuters: Treasury says 650,000 in trial home loan workouts

[The Treasury Department] said there were 650,994 active trial modifications through October under President Barack Obama's plan to help the housing market. That was up from 487,081 ... participating through September.

The Treasury did not release figures for trial modifications that have been made permanent.
The key number - permanent modifications - was not released. As of Sept 1st, the Obama plan had produced only 1,711 permanent loan modifications.

Why doesn't Treasury release the number of trial modifications started, the redefault rates for trial modifications (by month started) and the number of permanent modifications?

Diani Olick at CNBC has more: Shadow Inventory Dwarfs Loan Mods
[W]e have no idea how successful those mods are now five months after the program really got cooking.

It's coming, that's what the folks at Treasury say.

They also say that a lot of borrowers got extensions on the trial period in order to get paperwork together to move on to permanent modifications. Insiders however tell me that a lot of that paperwork has to do with those so-called "stated-income" loans, where you just had to tell the lender what you make for a living, not actually prove it. In order to move to a permanent mod, you have to prove it, so now we get to find out how many of those "liar loans" were just that.
emphasis added
The size of the next wave of foreclosures depends on the success of the modification programs. And right now Treasury is leaving us in the dark ...

Counterparty Risk: The Mortgage Insurers

by Calculated Risk on 11/10/2009 01:35:00 PM

From the Ambac 10-Q:

While management believes that Ambac will have sufficient liquidity to satisfy its needs through the second quarter of 2011, no guarantee can be given that it will be able to pay all of its operating expenses and debt service obligations thereafter, including maturing principal in the amount of $143,000 in August 2011. In addition, it is possible its liquidity may run out prior to the second quarter of 2011. Ambac is developing strategies to address its liquidity needs; such strategies may include a negotiated restructuring of its debt through a prepackaged bankruptcy proceeding. No assurances can be given that Ambac will be successful in executing any or all of its strategies. If Ambac is unable to execute these strategies, it will consider seeking bankruptcy protection without agreement concerning a plan of reorganization with major creditor groups.
emphasis added
Apparently the Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance will rule on Ambac’s statutory capital by November 16th. (ht JA)

And from Freddie Mac's 10-Q:
We have institutional credit risk relating to the potential insolvency or non-performance of mortgage insurers that insure single-family mortgages we purchase or guarantee. As a guarantor, we remain responsible for the payment of principal and interest if a mortgage insurer fails to meet its obligations to reimburse us for claims. If any of our mortgage insurers that provides credit enhancement fails to fulfill its obligation, we could experience increased credit-related costs and a possible reduction in the fair values associated with our PCs or Structured Securities.
...
Based upon currently available information, we expect that all of our mortgage insurance counterparties will continue to pay all claims as due in the normal course for the near term except for claims obligations of Triad that are partially deferred after June 1, 2009, under order of Triad’s state regulator. We believe that several of our mortgage insurance counterparties are at risk of falling out of compliance with regulatory capital requirements, which may result in regulatory actions that could threaten our ability to receive future claims payments, and negatively impact our access to mortgage insurance for high LTV loans. Further, one or more of these mortgage insurers, over the remainder of 2009 or in the first half of 2010, could lack sufficient capital to pay claims and face suspension under Freddie Mac’s eligibility requirements for mortgage insurers.
More from MarketWatch: MBIA loses $728 million as slowdown hits bond insurer

The zombie watch continues ...

Fed's Yellen on the Economic Outlook

by Calculated Risk on 11/10/2009 10:53:00 AM

Lately I’ve been leaning against the view of a “V shaped” recovery. I think that growth will be decent in the second half of 2009, but growth will be sluggish in 2010.

San Francisco Fed President Dr. Yellen has a similar view – from her speech this morning: The Outlook for the Economy and Real Estate

The big issue is how strong the upturn will be. With such enormous reservoirs of slack in the form of high unemployment and idle productive capacity, we need a strong rebound to put unemployed people back to work and get underutilized factories, offices, and stores humming again. Unfortunately, my own forecast envisions a less-than-robust recovery for several reasons. As the impetus from government programs and inventories diminishes in the quarters ahead, private final demand will have to fill the breach. The danger is that demand may grow at too anemic a pace to support vigorous expansion.

First, it may take quite a while for financial institutions to heal to the point that normal credit flows are restored. The credit crunch hasn’t entirely gone away. In the face of massive loan losses, banks have clamped down on underwriting and credit terms for both businesses and consumers. Smaller businesses without direct access to capital markets are particularly feeling the pinch. Lenders have had to run hard just to stay in place: Rising unemployment, business failures, and delinquencies in real estate markets have fed additional credit losses and made it more difficult for financial institutions to get their balance sheets in good order.

Second, households have been pummeled and prospects for consumer spending are cloudy. Consumers have surprised us in the past with their free-spending ways and it’s not out of the question that they will do so again. But I wouldn’t count on them leading a strong recovery. They face high and rising unemployment, stagnant wages, and heavy debt burdens. Their nest eggs have shrunk dramatically as house and stock prices have fallen, and their access to credit has been squeezed.

It may be that we are witnessing the start of a new era for consumers following the harsh financial blows they have endured. ...

Weakness in the labor market is another factor that may keep the recovery sluggish for quite some time. Payroll employment has been plummeting for more than a year and a half, and, even though the pace of the decline has slowed, unemployment now stands at its highest level since 1983. In addition, many workers have seen their hours cut or are experiencing involuntary furloughs. ... my business contacts say they will be reluctant to hire again until they see clear evidence of a sustained recovery. High unemployment, weak job growth, and paltry wage increases are a recipe for sluggish consumer spending growth and a tepid recovery.

... the outlook for housing has turned up in response to favorable mortgage rates, lower house prices, and a lower overhang of unsold houses. And growth in this sector should contribute to the overall economic recovery. These developments represent real gains, but it’s important not to get carried away. Some of the advance reflects temporary government support in the form of tax credits for first-time home buyers, and the impact of loan modification programs and foreclosure moratoriums that reduced the pace of distressed sales. Moreover, foreclosure notices surged earlier this year and distressed property sales may rise once again in the months ahead. If so, we could see renewed pressure on house prices. Of course, continuing high unemployment will also fuel additional foreclosures. And the supply of credit for nonconforming mortgages remains extremely tight. Financial institutions are reluctant to place them on their books when they are trying to reduce leverage and we have yet to see any revival of the market for private mortgage-backed securities.

When we turn to commercial real estate, the prospects are worrisome. ...

When the weakness of the commercial property market is combined with the muted outlook for housing and consumer spending, you can see why I believe that the overall economic recovery is likely to be gradual and remain vulnerable to shocks. It’s popular to pick a letter of the alphabet to describe the likely course of the economy. The letter I would choose doesn’t exist in our alphabet, but if I were to describe it, it would look something like an “L” with a gradual upward tilt of the base. With such a slow rebound, unemployment could well stay high for several years to come. In other words, our recovery is likely to feel like something well short of good times.
emphasis added

Fed's Lockhart on CRE and Small Business

by Calculated Risk on 11/10/2009 09:23:00 AM

From Atlanta Fed President Dennis Lockhart: Economic Recovery, Small Business, and the Challenge of Commercial Real Estate

[H]ow serious is the CRE problem for the financial system and the broad economy?

First, let me provide some overview comments: While the CRE problem is serious for parts of the banking industry, I don't believe it poses a broad risk to the financial system. Compared with residential real estate, the size of the CRE debt market is smaller, and the exposure is more concentrated in smaller banks.

However, I am concerned about the potential impact of CRE on the broader economy. Unlike residential real estate, there is not the same direct linkage from CRE to household wealth—and therefore consumption—caused by erosion of home equity. However, there could be an impact resulting from small banks' impaired ability to support the small business sector—a sector I expect will be critically important to job creation.

To add some detail: At the end of June 2009 there was approximately $3.5 trillion of outstanding debt associated with CRE. This figure compares with about $11 trillion of residential debt outstanding.

About 40 percent of the CRE debt is held on commercial bank balance sheets in the form of whole loans. A lot of the CRE exposure is concentrated at smaller institutions (banks with total assets under $10 billion). These smaller banks account for only 20 percent of total commercial banking assets in the United States but carry almost half of total CRE loans (based on Bank Call Report data).

Many small businesses rely on these smaller banks for credit. Small banks account for almost half of all small business loans (loans under $1 million). Moreover, small firms' reliance on banks with heavy CRE exposure is substantial. Banks with the highest CRE exposure (CRE loan books that are more than three times their tier 1 capital) account for almost 40 percent of all small business loans.

To repeat my current assessment, while the CRE problem is very worrisome for parts of the banking industry, I don't see it posing a broad risk to the financial system. Nonetheless, CRE could be a factor that suppresses the pace of recovery. As the recovery develops, the CRE problem will be a headwind, but not a show stopper, in my view.

It's appropriate to be a bit tentative in the assessment of CRE risk to the financial system, however. In 2007, many underestimated the scale and contagion potential of the subprime residential mortgage-backed securities problem. With this experience in mind, my assessment should continue to be refined.
As Lockhart noted earlier in the speech, small business employment has been especially hard hit during the current employment recession. (Note: this is probably one of the key reasons that the BLS birth/death model has overestimated new job creation).

Many of the banks in trouble because of CRE lending are also key lenders to small businesses. Therefore this might limit small business financing, and further inhibit small business job creation.

Tough Times for the Travel Industry

by Calculated Risk on 11/10/2009 08:43:00 AM

According to an article in the LA Times, it appears the 2009 holiday season will be worse than 2008 for the travel industry: Airlines, hotels face bleak holidays

According to the Auto Club, 46% of those surveyed said they planned to spend the same amount on holiday travel as they did last year, while 36% planned to spend less. Only 18% planned to spend more.
The article also mentions a forecast for air travel: ATA Expects 4 Percent Decline in Air Travel Over 12-Day Thanksgiving Holiday Period
The Air Transport Association of America (ATA), the industry trade association for the leading U.S. airlines, today said that it expects a 4 percent year-over-year decrease in the number of passengers traveling on U.S. airlines during the 2009 Thanksgiving holiday season, despite deep discounting over the past several months.

“It is increasingly apparent that the economic head winds facing the airlines and their customers are anything but behind us. ...” said ATA President and CEO James C. May.

... Carriers have cut back their schedules in response to economic pressures, with 2009 capacity reductions the deepest since 1942. In addition, recently released government data show that average domestic airfares in the second quarter of 2009 fell to their lowest level since 1998, dropping 13 percent from the second quarter of 2008 – the largest year-to-year decline on record.
emphasis added
And of course this will be a very difficult holiday season for hotels.

Employment and the Seasonal Adjustment

by Calculated Risk on 11/10/2009 12:19:00 AM

Floyd Norris at the NY Times asks: Did Unemployment Really Rise?

The economic reactions over the weekend to Friday’s employment report all started from the assumption that things grew much worse in October. The unemployment rate leaped to 10.2 percent from 9.8 percent. Another 190,000 jobs vanished.

Actually, none of that happened.

In reality, the government report says unemployment rates remained steady at 9.5 percent. And the number of jobs actually rose, by 80,000. ...

The adjustments are for seasonality. ... All this may be very reasonable, and there is no way I can think of to test whether the seasonal adjustments are reliable. But I suspect seasonal factors are less important this year, when the economy may be changing directions, than they normally are.
I'm not sure where the 80,000 number came from - the not seasonally adjusted (NSA) payroll employment increased by 641,000 in October - but the BLS did report a 9.5% NSA unemployment rate.

However there is a strong and consistent seasonal pattern for employment, and I think the seasonal adjusted numbers are the ones to use. I wrote about this earlier this year (excerpt with an updated graph):
What if I wrote that U.S. payroll employment increased by 383 thousand jobs in May 2009 following an increase of 259 thousand jobs in April 2009?

Some readers would suspect CR had been captured by aliens or had visited crazytown.

But, in fact, those numbers are exactly what the BLS reported as the actual change in payroll employment in April and May. The economy added 643 thousand jobs over those two months. However no one reports those numbers because there is a strong seasonal pattern to employment.

Even in the best of years, 2.5 to 3.0 million people lose their jobs in January. It happens every year for a number of reasons such as retail cutting back on holiday hires. And just about every July the economy loses over 1 million jobs for seasonal reasons too.

The following graph shows this seasonal pattern:

Payroll Employment Seasonal Adjustment Click on graph for larger image in new window.

The blue line is the seasonally adjusted (SA) change in net jobs as reported by the BLS, and the red columns are the actual not seasonally adjusted (NSA) data.

No one reports the NSA data because the swings are so wild and the pattern very consistent. Unless you follow the data closely, the NSA numbers are meaningless.
There may be problems with the BLS numbers - as an example the birth/death model has consistently overestimated new job creation during the current employment recession, possibly because small businesses have been impacted more than larger companies. But the model used by the BLS for seasonal adjustments is very good, and the SA number is still the one to use.

Monday, November 09, 2009

Mishkin: Not all bubbles the same

by Calculated Risk on 11/09/2009 09:24:00 PM

Former Fed Governor Frederic Mishkin writes in the Financial Times: Not all bubbles present a risk to the economy

There is increasing concern that we may be experiencing another round of asset-price bubbles that could pose great danger to the economy. Does this danger provide a case for the US Federal Reserve to exit from its zero-interest-rate policy sooner rather than later, as many commentators have suggested? The answer is no.
excerpted with permission
Mishkin outlines two different types of bubbles, and argues a "credit boom bubble" poses a risk to the economy, but a "pure irrational exuberance bubble" does not.

For more excerpts, see EconomistView: "Not All Bubbles Present a Risk to the Economy"