by Calculated Risk on 12/29/2009 04:40:00 PM

From the American Trucking Association: ATA Truck Tonnage Index Jumped 2.7 Percent In November

Click on graph for slightly larger image in new window.

The American Trucking Associations’ advance seasonally adjusted (SA) For-Hire Truck Tonnage Index increased 2.7 percent in November, following a 0.2 percent contraction in October. The latest gain boosted the SA index from 103.6 (2000=100) in October to 106.4, its highest level in a year. The not seasonally adjusted index, which represents the change in tonnage actually hauled by the fleets before any seasonal adjustment, equaled 100.8 in November, down 8.0 percent from October.

Compared with November 2008, SA tonnage fell 3.5 percent, which was the best year-over-year showing in twelve months. In October, the index was down 5.2 percent from a year earlier.

ATA Chief Economist Bob Costello said that tonnage is moving in the right direction. “Slowly, but surely, truck freight has started the recovery process and November’s solid increase is a very positive sign,” Costello noted. He said that November’s tonnage levels were pushed higher by improved economic activity, as well as by an inventory correction that is near completion. “Truck freight had been hurt by both slow economic output and bloated inventories; however, we now have evidence that the inventories are in much better shape, which will not be such a drag on truck freight volumes.” Costello continued to be cautious about the future though. “While the economy and trucking is improving, the industry should not get overly excited about the sizeable increase in November. I continue to believe that both the economy and truck tonnage will exhibit starts and stops in the months ahead, but the general trend should be for moderate growth.”
...
Trucking serves as a barometer of the U.S. economy, representing nearly 69 percent of tonnage carried by all modes of domestic freight transportation, including manufactured and retail goods.

The economy fell off a cliff in September 2008, so the year-over-year comparisons are getting easier. As ATA Chief Economist Bob Costello noted, trucking benefited from the inventory correct, and he believes that is nearing completion - and trucking will likely "exhibit starts and stops" until there is a pickup in domestic end demand.

Note: I think this is the highest level since January, unless January was revised down.

by Calculated Risk on 12/29/2009 02:38:00 PM

Kathleen Pender at the San Francisco Chronicle reminds everyone of the changes to the FDIC's Transaction Account Guarantee Program: $250,000 in bank? Check deposit insurance

There is no change for those with less than $250,000 in the bank:

Deposits at all banks will still be insured up to $250,000 through 2013 under the FDIC's general deposit insurance rules, so the vast majority of consumers don't need to worry. But starting Friday, checking account balances that exceed $250,000 will no longer be covered under the FDIC's Transaction Account Guarantee Program at some banks.
...
Although few individuals keep more than $250,000 in a checking account, many businesses and nonprofits do to handle payroll, accounts receivable and other cash-flow needs. Even a small business might occasionally have a balance exceeding $250,000 when a large payment comes in or a big bill is coming due.

The FDIC's Transaction Account Guarantee Program will continue (insuring non-interest-bearing transactional accounts above $250,000), but the FDIC raised the fees and many banks have opted-out.

The program was supposed to expire at the end of this year, but in August the FDIC announced it would continue through June 30. However, starting Friday the fee will jump to 15, 20 or 25 cents per $100 in insured deposits, depending on the bank's risk category.

Banks had until Nov. 2 to tell the FDIC if they would opt out of the program at the end of this year. The FDIC could not say how many banks did, but many large ones - including Citibank, Bank of America, Chase and Wells Fargo - have disclosed they are dropping out.

What matters for most people is that deposits are still insured up to $250,000. For more, here is the FDIC site: Your Insured Deposits

by Calculated Risk on 12/29/2009 11:46:00 AM

This following graph compares the Case-Shiller Composite 10 SA index with the Stress Test scenarios from the Treasury (stress test data is estimated from quarterly forecasts).

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

The Stress Test scenarios use the Composite 10 index and start in December. Here are the numbers:

Case-Shiller Composite 10 Index (SA), October: 157.56

Stress Test Baseline Scenario, October: 142.3

Stress Test More Adverse Scenario, October: 130.6

House prices are 10.7% higher than the baseline scenario, and 20.6% higher than the more adverse scenario.

There were three key economic stress test parameters: house prices, GDP and unemployment. Both house prices and GDP are performing better than the baseline scenario, and unemployment is performing worse than both stress test scenarios.

Price-to-Rent

In October 2004, Fed economist John Krainer and researcher Chishen Wei wrote a Fed letter on price to rent ratios: House Prices and Fundamental Value. Kainer and Wei presented a price-to-rent ratio using the OFHEO house price index and the Owners' Equivalent Rent (OER) from the BLS.

Here is a similar graph through October 2009 using the Case-Shiller Composite Indices (SA):

This graph shows the price to rent ratio (January 2000 = 1.0) for the Case-Shiller composite indices. For rents, the national Owners' Equivalent Rent from the BLS is used.

At the peak of the housing bubble it was obvious that prices were out of line with fundamentals such as price-to-rent, price-to-income and real prices. Now most of the adjustment in the price-to-rent ratio is behind us.

It appears the ratio is still a little high, and the recent increase was a combination of falling rents and rising house prices (probably due to the massive government intervention). I expect some further decline in prices, although it isn't as obvious as in 2005.

Comparison to LoanPerformance

And finally, here is a graph of the LoanPerformance index (with and without foreclosures) and the Case-Shiller Composite 20 index. Earlier LoanPerformance announced that house prices fell 0.7% in October.

This graph shows the three indices with January 2000 = 100.

The indices mostly move together over time. Notice how the total LoanPerformance index fell further than the index excluding foreclosures - and also rebounded more.

The seasonally adjusted Case-Shiller index increased slightly in October and the LoanPerformance index showed a decline. However Case-Shiller is an average of three months, so there might be a decline next month.

by Calculated Risk on 12/29/2009 09:30:00 AM

S&P/Case-Shiller released their monthly Home Price Indices for October this morning.

This monthly data includes prices for 20 individual cities, and two composite indices (10 cities and 20 cities). This is the Seasonally Adjusted data - some sites report the NSA data.

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

The first graph shows the nominal seasonally adjusted Composite 10 and Composite 20 indices (the Composite 20 was started in January 2000).

The Composite 10 index is off 30.5% from the peak, and up about 0.4% in October.

The Composite 20 index is off 29.5% from the peak, and up 0.4% in October.

NOTE: S&P reported this as "flat", but they were using the NSA data.

The second graph shows the Year over year change in both indices.

The Composite 10 is off 6.4% from October 2008.

The Composite 20 is off 7.3% from October 2008.

This is still a significant YoY decline in prices.

The third graph shows the price declines from the peak for each city included in S&P/Case-Shiller indices.

Prices decreased (SA) in 9 of the 20 Case-Shiller cities in October.

In Las Vegas, house prices have declined 56.3% from the peak. At the other end of the spectrum, prices in Dallas are only off about 5.4% from the peak - and up slightly in 2009. Prices have declined by double digits from the peak in 18 of the 20 Case-Shiller cities.

The impact of the massive government effort to support house prices led to small increases in prices over the Summer, and the question is what happens to prices as these programs end over the next 6 months. I expect further price declines in many cities. I'll have more ...

by Calculated Risk on 12/29/2009 09:05:00 AM

Still waiting for the data ...

From S&P:

“The turn-around in home prices seen in the Spring and Summer has faded with only seven of the 20 cities seeing month-to-month gains, although all 20 continue to show improvements on a year-over-year basis. All in all, this report should be described as flat.” says David M. Blitzer, Chairman of the Index Committee at Standard & Poor’s.
...
As of October 2009, average home prices across the United States are at similar levels to where they were in the autumn of 2003. From the peak in the second quarter of 2006 through the trough in April 2009, the 10-City Composite is down 33.5% and the 20-City Composite is down 32.6%. With the relative improvement of the past few months, the peak-to-date figures through October 2009 are -29.8% and -29.0%, respectively.

Prices declined in 12 of the 20 Case-Shiller cities, and were flat in New York.

by Calculated Risk on 12/28/2009 11:54:00 PM

From Eric Pryne at the Seattle Times: Commercial real-estate market suffered in 2009; more of the same forecast for 2010

In 2007, developers excavated a deep hole in downtown Seattle at Second Avenue and Pine Street for the foundation of a 23-story luxury hotel and condo tower.

They filled the hole in 2009.

That pretty much captures the kind of year it's been for commercial real estate in the Seattle area.

Lots of good information in the article about commercial real estate in the Seattle area. After discussing rising vacancy rates and falling rents, the article finishes with this great quote:

"About a year and a half ago, we thought we were different," [Jim DeLisle, a University of Washington professor of real-estate studies] told one recent forum. "Nobody is really different."

How times did we hear "it is different here" during the housing bust?

by Calculated Risk on 12/28/2009 08:01:00 PM

Here is the monthly Fannie Mae hockey stick graph ...

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

Fannie Mae reported today that the rate of serious delinquencies - at least 90 days behind - for conventional loans in its single-family guarantee business increased to 4.98% in October, up from 4.72% in September - and up from 1.89% in October 2008.

"Includes seriously delinquent conventional single-family loans as a percent of the total number of conventional single-family loans. These rates are based on conventional single-family mortgage loans and exclude reverse mortgages and non-Fannie Mae mortgage securities held in our portfolio.
...
A measure of credit performance and indicator of future defaults for the single-family ... credit books. We include single-family loans that are three months or more past due or in the foreclosure process ... We include conventional single-family loans that we own and that back Fannie Mae MBS in our single-family delinquency rate, including those with substantial credit enhancement."

Just more evidence of the growing delinquency problem, although it is important to note these stats do include Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) loans in trial modifications (and the trial modification periods have been extended again).

by Calculated Risk on 12/28/2009 06:36:00 PM

Last Thursday, Treasury issued an Update on Status of Support for Housing Programs. One of the key points was to increase the cap on Treasury's funding commitment "to accommodate any cumulative reduction in net worth over the next three years".

Here were the reasons given:

Treasury will also amend the terms of its agreements with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to support their ongoing stability. The steps outlined today are necessary for preserving the continued strength and stability of the mortgage market.
emphasis added

and

The amendments to these agreements announced today should leave no uncertainty about the Treasury's commitment to support these firms as they continue to play a vital role in the housing market during this current crisis.

Why not just be explicit and explain the reasons for the change?

I speculated on Saturday that this might have something to do with more modifications. Others thought this was possible, from MarketWatch:

The government may put a mortgage-modification effort, called the Home Affordable Modification Program, or HAMP, into overdrive in coming years, pushing for reductions in the principal outstanding on home loans overseen by Fannie and Freddie, Bose George, an analyst at Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, wrote in a note to investors Monday.

Others thought this was wrong, from housing economist Tom Lawler today:

[A] few folks postulated that the Treasury’s move to explicitly up the government’s potential support for Fannie and Freddie might be related to plans by the Treasury to expand the HAMP to include a principal reduction plan, which would accelerate losses on HAMP modifications. I have no clue what’s going on in the minds of Treasury officials, I very much doubt that any such change in the cards soon.

Note: of course HAMP already allows principal reductions, but servicers receive no additional subsidy for principal reduction.

Credit Suisse argued that this increases the prospect of "large-scale voluntary buyouts" of delinquent mortgages guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie. Other analysts have argued this could be related to the adoption of FAS 166/167 in January.

And still another analyst suggested Fannie and Freddie would become the world’s biggest SIVs, and he viewed this as an attempt to hold down mortgage rates after the conclusion of the Fed's program to purchase MBS.

Dean Baker wrote at the HuffPost: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Just a Four-Letter Word?

Since Fannie and Freddie went into conservatorship in September of 2008, it has been explicit policy that the government would back up their debt. Originally, $200 billion was committed for this purpose. That amount was subsequently doubled to $400 billion ... [T]he Obama administration should make its case to the public and explain how losses could conceivably run above $400 billion (credit markets don't need reassurance against inconceivable events).

And that is really the bottom line: Why did Treasury release this on Christmas Eve with essentially no explanation. This has just lead to speculation and confusion. Why not be explicit? Why should we have to guess?

"What we've got here is ... failure to communicate." (from Cool Hand Luke)

by Calculated Risk on 12/28/2009 03:55:00 PM

Since it has been a while ...

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

The first graph shows the S&P 500 since 1990.

The dashed line is the closing price today. The S&P 500 was first at this level in April 1998; over 11 1/2 years ago.

The S&P 500 is up 67% from the bottom (451 points), and still off 28% from the peak (438 points below the max).


The second graph is from Doug Short of dshort.com (financial planner): "Four Bad Bears".

Note that the Great Depression crash is based on the DOW; the three others are for the S&P 500.

by Calculated Risk on 12/28/2009 12:52:00 PM

From Bloomberg: Fannie, Freddie Changes Clear Way for ‘Large-Scale’ Buyouts

The U.S. government’s expanded capital backstops and portfolio limits for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac increase “the prospect of large-scale” purchases by the companies of delinquent mortgages out of the securities they guarantee, according to Credit Suisse Group analysts.
...
“This announcement increases the prospect of large-scale voluntary buyouts by removing the portfolio cap hurdle and helping funding by potentially increasing debt-investor confidence,” Mahesh Swaminathan and Qumber Hassan, the Credit Suisse debt analysts in New York, wrote in a report yesterday.

Tanta discussed this possibility a couple of years ago:

Fannie Mae has always had the option to repurchase seriously delinquent loans out of its MBS at par (100% of the unpaid principal balance) plus accrued interest to the payoff date. This returns principal to the investors, so they are made whole. If Fannie Mae can work with the servicer to cure these loans, they become performing loans in Fannie Mae’s portfolio. If they cannot be cured, they are foreclosed, and Fannie Mae shows the charge-off and foreclosure expense on its portfolio’s books (these are no longer on the MBS’s books, since the loan was bought out of the MBS pool).

Now, Fannie also sometimes has the obligation to buy loans out of an MBS pool. But we are—Fannie Mae made this clear both in the footnote to Table 26 of the Q and in the conference call—talking about optional repurchases. Why would Fannie Mae buy nonperforming loans it doesn’t have to buy? Because it has agreed to workout efforts on these loans, including but not necessarily limited to pursuing a modification. Under Fannie Mae MBS rules, worked out loans have to be removed from the pools (and the MBS has to receive par for them, even if their market value is much less than that).
emphasis added

I suspect the uncapping the losses of Fannie and Freddie is related to modifications (update: others don't think this has anything to do with mods)