by Calculated Risk on 8/29/2009 09:38:00 PM

Here is some data from the Atlanta Fed on cash buyers in the southeast. This is part of the economic and financial highlights the Atlanta Fed puts out weekly.

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

From the Economic Highlight:

Orlando and Tampa Realtor data [earlier] showed an increase in the share of cash buyers, but in recent months that share has weakened somewhat.

In the Knoxville market, where home sales and prices did not accelerate as much as in Orlando and Tampa, the share of cash buyers had peaked earlier in the year but has tapered off since March.

The percentages for Orlanda and Tampa are similar to the percentages in the lower priced areas of the California Bay Area: see the table in Carolyn Said's recent article in the San Francisco Chronicle 'Cash is king' in market for foreclosed homes

I suspect many of these cash buyers are investors buying for cash flow (not the speculators we saw during the boom). Frequently these investors are buying in the same areas as first-time home buyers (some motivated by the $8K tax credit) - and the competition is pushing up prices and reducing supply. Now if we just had better first-time home buyer data ...

by Calculated Risk on 8/29/2009 05:40:00 PM

Andy Kroll at Mother Jones discusses problems with the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP): The Foreclosure Rescue Mirage

Industry experts are now questioning how many of the program’s estimated 235,000 modifications will actually benefit homeowners in the long term, and say that homeowners clamoring to participate in HAMP have created an industrywide logjam for mortgage servicers, resulting in substantial delays and backed-up customer service support. The Treasury’s first servicer performance report (PDF), covering March to July 2009, found that servicers had offered modifications to just 15 percent of eligible delinquent homeowners, and initiated them for just 9 percent of that group.

I've heard from servicers who've said they are just overwhelmed and are staffing up to meet the demand. And it appears the administration is trying to make improvements:

Despite its flaws, HAMP is a good-faith effort by the government to address the foreclosure crisis, and there are signs of improvement. In June, HAMP officials began conducting much more rigorous reviews of servicers, and have started a "second look" program, in which servicers’ decisions to approve or deny HAMP modifications are scrutinized. Compliance officials are also analyzing samples of HAMP-modified loans to track error rates with servicers. And government officials have on several occasions tried to light a fire under HAMP servicers to speed up the modification process.

Some believe HAMP will fall far short of the goals:

The Treasury has set a target of modifying 4 million mortgages by 2012, but Moody's estimates HAMP will in fact modify only 1.5 to 2 million.

The Treasury disagrees:

More than 400,000 modification offers have been extended and more than 230,000 trial modifications have begun. This pace of modifications puts the program on track to offer assistance to up to 3 to 4 million homeowners over the next three years, our target on February 18.

Actually the original press release stated the program "will help up to 3 to 4 million at-risk homeowners avoid foreclosure" and the new press release says "offer assistance to up to 3 to 4 million homeowners". A few word changes makes a significant difference.

The Treasury's current target is 500,000 cumulative trial modifications started by November 1st, up from the 235,000 cumulative at the end of July. At that pace (about 90 thousand trials started per month), the cumulative trial modifications started will be close to 3.0 million by early 2012 - however many of those borrowers will probably redefault. Anyone who redefaults will have been "offered assistance", but probably will not "avoid foreclosure".

The article has a few interesting anecdotes of the struggles of borrowers in dealing with their servicers. My best wishes to Kristina Page. Thanks for mentioning CR!

by Calculated Risk on 8/29/2009 01:02:00 PM

The Census Bureau has released the "Quarterly Starts and Completions by Purpose and Design" report for Q2 2009 a few days ago.

Monthly housing starts (even single family starts) cannot be compared directly to new home sales, because the monthly housing starts report from the Census Bureau includes apartments, owner built units and condos that are not included in the new home sales report.

However it is possible to compare "Single Family Starts, Built for Sale" to New Home sales on a quarterly basis. The quarterly report shows that there were 82,000 single family starts, built for sale, in Q2 2009 and that is less than the 102,000 new homes sold for the same period. This data is Not Seasonally Adjusted (NSA). This suggests homebuilders are selling more homes than they are starting.

Note: new home sales are reported when contracts are signed, so it is appropriate to compare sales to starts (as opposed to completions). This is not perfect because homebuilders were stuck with “unintentional spec homes” during the housing bust because of the high cancellation rates, but cancellation rates are now much closer to normal.

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

This graph provides a quarterly comparison of housing starts and new home sales. In 2005, and most of 2006, starts were higher than sales, and inventories of new homes rose sharply. For the last seven quarters, starts have been below sales – and new home inventories have been falling.

The second graph shows the NSA quarterly starts intent for four categories since 1975: single family built for sale, owner built (includes contractor built for owner), starts built for rent, and condos built for sale.

Condo starts in Q2 tied the all time record low for Condos built for sale set in Q1 (5,000); the previous record was 8,000 set in Q1 1991 (data started in 1975).

Owner built units are above the record low set last quarter (38,000 units compared to 24,000 units in Q1 2009), however the pickup in starts was probably mostly seasonal (this is NSA data).

And single family units built for sale were also above the record low set last quarter (82,000 compared to 53,000 in Q1 2009).

by Calculated Risk on 8/29/2009 10:11:00 AM

As a companion to the August 28 Problem Bank List (unofficial), below is a list of failed banks since Jan 2007.

The FDIC released the Q2 Quarterly Banking Profile this week. The report showed that the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) balance had fallen to $10.4 billion or 0.22% of insured deposits.

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

The graph shows the cumulative estimated losses to the FDIC Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) and the quarterly assets of the DIF (as reported by the FDIC). Note that the FDIC takes reserves against future losses in the DIF, and collects fees and special assessments - so you can't just subtract estimated losses from assets to determine the assets remaining in the DIF.

The cumulative estimated losses for the DIF are now over $40 billion.

In this Dick Bove interview with CNNMoney, the interviewer Poppy Harlow said:

"When we look at that list though - we don't get the names from the FDIC obviously - only about 13% of the bank on that list actually end up failing".

The 13% number is historically accurate, but that is over the entire cycle - and this down cycle will probably be worse than most. So during this down period, the percentage will probably be much higher. As far as the names of the banks on the "list", most of them are on the Unofficial Problem Bank list.

The FDIC closed three more banks on Friday, and that brings the total FDIC bank failures to 84 in 2009.

Failed Bank List

Deposits, assets and estimated losses are all in thousands of dollars.

Losses for failed banks in 2009 are the initial FDIC estimates. The percent losses are as a percent of assets.

See description below table for Class and Cert (and a link to FDIC ID system).

The table is wide - use scroll bars to see all information!

Click here for a full screen version.

NOTE: Columns are sortable - click on column header (Assets, State, Bank Name, Date, etc.)




Class: from FDIC

The FDIC assigns classification codes indicating an institution's charter type (commercial bank, savings bank, or savings association), its chartering agent (state or federal government), its Federal Reserve membership status (member or nonmember), and its primary federal regulator (state-chartered institutions are subject to both federal and state supervision). These codes are:

N National chartered commercial bank supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

SM State charter Fed member commercial bank supervised by the Federal Reserve

NM State charter Fed nonmember commercial bank supervised by the FDIC

SA State or federal charter savings association supervised by the Office of Thrift Supervision

SB State charter savings bank supervised by the FDIC

Cert: This is the certificate number assigned by the FDIC used to identify institutions and for the issuance of insurance certificates. You can click on the number and see "the last demographic and financial data filed by the selected institution".

by Calculated Risk on 8/28/2009 11:55:00 PM

From Rolfe Winkler at Reuters: Judge puts Fed's bailout revelations on hold

Chief Judge Loretta Preska of the U.S. District Court in Manhattan stayed her August 24 order in favor of Bloomberg News, which had sought [the names of the banks that have participated in the Federal Reserve's emergency lending programs] under the federal Freedom of Information Act, so that the central bank could appeal.

This case might go on and on. Perhaps Barney Frank and Ron Paul will pass new legislation requiring auditing the Fed before this FOIA case makes it through the courts.

UPDATE: Mish says Ron Paul RonPaul.com makes clear in an email to Mish that Frank is not talking HR1207, but an overall regulation.

"[W]e will subject [the Federal Reserve] to a complete audit. I have been working with Ron Paul, who is the main sponsor of that bill. He agrees that we don't want to have the audit appear as if it is influencing monetary policy, because that would be inflationary. And Ron and I agree on that.

One of the things the audit will show you is what the Federal Reserve buys and sells. And that will be made public, but not instantly, because if that was made instantly you would have a lot people trading off of that and you would have too much impact the market - and again Ron agrees with that. So we will publicly have that data released after a time period of several months, enough time so it wouldn't be market sensitive. That will be part of the overall Federal regulation that we are redacting.

The House will pass [the bill] probably in October."

by Calculated Risk on 8/28/2009 09:19:00 PM

The West setting sun
Affinity burned brightly
Extinguished today
by Soylent Green is People
From the FDIC: Pacific Western Bank, San Diego, California, Assumes All of the Deposits of Affinity Bank, Ventura, California

Affinity Bank, Ventura, California, was closed today by the California Department of Financial Institutions, which appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver. ...

As of July 10, 2009, Affinity Bank had total assets of $1 billion and total deposits of approximately $922 million. ...

The FDIC and Pacific Western Bank entered into a loss-share transaction on approximately $934 million of Affinity Bank's assets. ...

The FDIC estimates that the cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) will be $254 million. ... Affinity Bank is the 84th FDIC-insured institution to fail in the nation this year, and the ninth in California. The last FDIC-insured institution closed in the state was Vineyard Bank, National Association, Rancho Cucamonga, on July 17, 2009.

A quarter of billion here, a quarter of a billion there ...

by Calculated Risk on 8/28/2009 07:10:00 PM

Wise men once have said
Chance favors the prepaired mind
not so for Mainstreet.
by Soylent Green is People
From the FDIC: Central Bank, Stillwater, Minnesota, Assumes All of the Deposits of Mainstreet Bank, Forest Lake, Minnesota

Mainstreet Bank, Forest Lake, Minnesota, was closed today by the Minnesota Department of Commerce, which appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver. ...

As of June 30, 2009, Mainstreet Bank had total assets of $459 million and total deposits of approximately $434 million. ...

The FDIC and Central Bank entered into a loss-share transaction on approximately $268 million of Mainstreet Bank's assets. ...

The FDIC estimates that the cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) will be $95 million. ... Mainstreet Bank is the 83rd FDIC-insured institution to fail in the nation this year, and the second in Minnesota. The last FDIC-insured institution to be closed in the state was Horizon Bank, Pine City, on June 26, 2009.

Two down today.

by Calculated Risk on 8/28/2009 06:10:00 PM

Summer heat scorches
Three...four hundred...one thousand???
Bradford bank now toast.
by Soylent Green is People
From the FDIC: Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company, Buffalo, New York, Assumes All of the Deposits of Bradford Bank, Baltimore, Maryland

Bradford Bank, Baltimore, Maryland, was closed today by the Office of Thrift Supervision, which appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver. ...

As of June 30, 2009, Bradford Bank had total assets of $452 million and total deposits of approximately $383 million. ...

The FDIC and M&T entered into a loss-share transaction on approximately $338 million of Bradford Bank's assets. ...

The FDIC estimates that the cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) will be $97 million. ... Bradford Bank is the 82nd FDIC-insured institution to fail in the nation this year, and the second in Maryland. The last FDIC-insured institution closed in the state was Suburban Federal Savings Bank, Crofton, on January 30, 2009.

It is Friday.

by Calculated Risk on 8/28/2009 04:00:00 PM

While we wait for the first bank failure of the day, here is the Problem Bank List (Unofficial) Aug 28, 2009 .

And a few interesting notes ...

From the WSJ: Cerberus Holders Elect to Leave Core Funds

Cerberus Capital Management's investors overwhelmingly want out of the firm's core hedge funds, asking for the return of more than $5.5 billion, or almost 71% of the fund assets, according to people familiar with the matter.

"We have been surprised by this response," Cerberus chief Stephen Feinberg and co-founder William Richter wrote in a letter delivered to clients late Thursday.

And see Tanta's first post on CR in 2006: Tanta: Let Slip the Dogs of Hell (T wrote under her own byline soon after).

I still haven’t gotten over the fact that there’s a “capital management” group out there having named itself “Cerberus”. Those of you who were not asleep in Miss Buttkicker’s Intro to Western Civ will recognize Cerberus; the rest of you may have picked up the mythological fix from its reprise as “Fluffy” in the first Harry Potter novel. Wherever you get your culture, Cerberus is the three-headed dog who guards the gates of Hell. It takes three heads to do that, of course, because it’s never clear, in theology or finance, whether the idea is to keep the righteous from falling into the pit or the demons from escaping out of it (the third head is busy meeting with the regulators). Cerberus is relevant not just because it supplies me with today’s metaphor, but because it was the Biggest Dog of three (including Citigroup and Aozora, a Japanese bank) who in April bought a 51% stake in GMAC’s mega-mortgage operation, GM having, of course, once been renowned as one of the Big Three Automakers until it became one of the Big Three Financing Outfits With A Sideline In Cars. I tried to find a link for you to Aozora Bank’s announcement of the purchase, but the only press release I could find for that day involved the loss of customer data. They must have been so busy letting GMAC into the underworld that the dog head keeping the deposit tickets from getting out got distracted.
...
I bring all this up not just to stick it to Citicorp, but because we’ve all been asking the question lately of who will be the bagholder when the exotic/subprime mortgage problem finds a home. We have noted in our discussions that credit risk can move in two directions: the wholesaler takes it off the originator and the bond investor takes it off the wholesaler/issuer with the helpful assistance of protection sellers in the hedge fund credit-swap market, but when the “DETOUR” signs pop up, the bond investor can work really hard on forcing it back to the wholesaler/issuer, who can try to put it back to the originator, who gets to try to recover something in a foreclosure sale. If the originator has any financial strength left to buy loans back with, that is; see the sad stories of Ownit, Option One, Fremont, New Century, etc.
[CR: remember T wrote this in 2006]
...
If you thought the only thing that would stop the circle jerk of risk was putting some credit and pricing discipline into the game, I guess you’re just a weenie like me. Anyone who can make sense of this is free to set me straight. And if the answer has “sorting socks” in it, don’t bother. I’ve tried that.

Read the entire post ... Tanta wouldn't have been "surprised" by the "response" of Cerberus' investors. BTW, Tanta and I first started talking about bagholders in early 2005 - and we both agreed it would largely be the U.S. taxpayer.

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

And a market graph from Doug Short.

This matches up the market bottoms for four crashes (with an interim bottom for the Great Depression).

Note that the Great Depression crash is based on the DOW; the three others are for the S&P 500.

And a flipper in 2006 (ht Yal). I believe this is her house today on Zillow, around $650K:

by Calculated Risk on 8/28/2009 01:50:00 PM

This is an unofficial list of Problem Banks.

The list is compiled from regulator press releases or from public news sources (see Enforcement Action Type link for source). The FDIC data is released monthly with a delay (the FDIC July Enforcement Actions were released today). The Fed and OTC data is more timely, and the OCC a little lagged. Credit: surferdude808.

Changes and comments from surferdude808:

The “unofficial Problem Bank list” underwent substantial changes since last week because of failures; new additions, especially from the OCC and FDIC as they released a number of actions for July; and an identification of unassisted mergers during Q2.

This week there are 412 institutions on the “unofficial Problem Bank list” with assets of $252.2 billion compared with 391 institutions with assets of $256.5 billion last week. The failure of Guaranty Bank with assets of $14.4 billion was responsible for the great majority of the asset decline. Another 10 institutions with assets of $2.5 billion were removed because of failure or unassisted merger and there was one action that was terminated.

Additions during the week are 32 institutions with assets of $15.7 billion. Most notable of these additions are the ShoreBank, Chicago, IL with assets of $2.7 billion and three subsidiaries of First National of Nebraska, Inc. (ticker symbol FINN) with assets of $4.5 billion.

Since the FDIC released the latest quarterly data, we were able to update assets for all institutions as of Q2. For the 381 institutions that were on the “unofficial Problem Bank list” at Q1 and Q2, assets declined by $3.3 billion.

With the FDIC Q2 release, we can see how well the “unofficial Problem Bank list” compares with the FDIC’s official Problem Bank list. The FDIC list includes 416 institutions with assets of $299.8 billion at Q2 while for a comparable period the “unofficial Problem Bank list” had 392 institutions with assets of $280 billion; thus, the unofficial list is a reasonable approximation with an acceptable tracking error.

See description below table for Class and Cert (and a link to FDIC ID system).

For a full screen version of the table click here.

The table is wide - use scroll bars to see all information!

NOTE: Columns are sortable - click on column header (Assets, State, Bank Name, Date, etc.)





Class: from FDIC

The FDIC assigns classification codes indicating an institution's charter type (commercial bank, savings bank, or savings association), its chartering agent (state or federal government), its Federal Reserve membership status (member or nonmember), and its primary federal regulator (state-chartered institutions are subject to both federal and state supervision). These codes are:

N National chartered commercial bank supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

SM State charter Fed member commercial bank supervised by the Federal Reserve

NM State charter Fed nonmember commercial bank supervised by the FDIC

SA State or federal charter savings association supervised by the Office of Thrift Supervision

SB State charter savings bank supervised by the FDIC

Cert: This is the certificate number assigned by the FDIC used to identify institutions and for the issuance of insurance certificates. Click on the number and the Institution Directory (ID) system "will provide the last demographic and financial data filed by the selected institution".

by Calculated Risk on 8/28/2009 10:23:00 AM

Next Friday the BLS employment report for August will be released.

Last month, when the unemployment rate dipped slightly to 9.4% from 9.5% in June, there were several articles like this one from the LA Times: Unemployment rate decline may indicate the recession has hit bottom.

Earlier I pointed out that the dip in unemployment was just monthly noise: Jobs and the Unemployment Rate

FAQ: How can the unemployment rate fall if the economy is losing net jobs, especially since the population is growing?

This data comes from two separate surveys. The unemployment Rate comes from the Current Population Survey (CPS: commonly called the household survey), a monthly survey of about 60,000 households.

The jobs number comes from Current Employment Statistics (CES: payroll survey), a sample of approximately 400,000 business establishments nationwide.

These are very different surveys: the CPS gives the total number of employed (and unemployed including the alternative measures), and the CES gives the total number of positions (excluding some categories like the self-employed, and a person working two jobs counts as two positions).
...
[T]he jobs and unemployment rate come from two different surveys and are different measurements (one for positions, the other for people). Some months the numbers may not seem to make sense (lost jobs and falling unemployment rate), but over time the numbers will work out.

Here are a couple of scatter graphs to illustrate this point ...

The first graph shows the monthly change in net jobs (on the x-axis) as a percentage of the civilian workforce, and the change in the unemployment rate on the y-axis.

The data is for the last 40 years: 1969 through July 2009.

Click on graph for large image.

Obviously there is a correlation - the more jobs added (further right on the x-axis), the more the unemployment rate declines (y-axis). And generally the more jobs lost, the more the unemployment rate increases.

But the graph sure is noisy on a monthly basis.

If the economy added 0.2% net jobs in one month (as a percent of the civilian workforce, or about 300 thousand net jobs currently), the unemployment rate could increase 0.2% or decrease 0.4% - and still be within the normal scatter.

The second graph covers the same period but on a quarterly basis:

Now we see a much sharper correlation.

The Red squares are the for 2008, and the first two quarters of 2009. This recession fits the normal pattern.

If the economy loses about 200 thousand jobs per month in August and September, this relationship suggests the unemployment rate will probably be close to 10% by the end of September.

This also suggests the economy needs to be adding about 0.33 percent of the civilian workforce per quarter to keep the unemployment rate from rising. That is about 170 thousand net jobs per month.

Note that the trend line is a 2nd order polynomial (equation on graph). When the economy starts to add jobs, more people start looking for work - and the relationship between net jobs and unemployment rate is not linear.

This graph show the employment-population ratio; this is the ratio of employed Americans to the adult population.

Note: the graph doesn't start at zero to better show the change.

The general upward trend from the early '60s was mostly due to women entering the workforce.

This measure fell slightly in July to 59.4%, the lowest level since the early '80s. However once the economy starts adding jobs, more people will be looking for work, and the employment-population ratio will start to increase. This means the stronger the economy, the more net jobs required each quarter to lower the unemployment rate by the same amount (as shown on the 2nd graph above).

The bottom line is the unemployment rate will still increase, and we will probably see 10% later this year.

by Calculated Risk on 8/28/2009 08:30:00 AM

From the BEA: Personal Income and Outlays, July 2009

Personal income increased $3.8 billion, or less than 0.1 percent, and disposable personal income (DPI) decreased $4.6 billion, or less than 0.1 percent, in July, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Personal consumption expenditures (PCE) increased $25.0 billion, or 0.2 percent.
...
Real PCE -- PCE adjusted to remove price changes -- increased 0.2 percent in July, compared with an increase of 0.1 percent in June.
...
Personal saving -- DPI less personal outlays – was $458.5 billion in July, compared with $486.8 billion in June. Personal saving as a percentage of disposable personal income was 4.2 percent in July, compared with 4.5 percent in June.

Click on graph for large image.

This graph shows the saving rate starting in 1959 (using a three month centered average for smoothing) through the July Personal Income report. The saving rate was 4.2% in July.

Households are saving substantially more than during the last few years (when the saving rate was around 1.0%). The saving rate will probably continue to rise.

The following graph shows real Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) through July (2005 dollars). Note that the y-axis doesn't start at zero to better show the change.

The quarterly change in PCE is based on the change from the average in one quarter, compared to the average of the preceding quarter.

The colored rectangles show the quarters, and the blue bars are the real monthly PCE.

The July numbers suggest PCE will grow at a 1.3% (annualized rate) in Q3.

Note that PCE declined sharply in Q3 and Q4 2008 - the cliff diving - and was been relatively flat in Q1 and Q2 2009. Auto sales should gave a boost to PCE in Q3, but in general PCE will probably remain weak over the 2nd half of 2009 and into 2010 as households continue to repair their balance sheets.

by Calculated Risk on 8/28/2009 12:16:00 AM

From MarketWatch: Japan reports record unemployment rate for July

Japan [reported] a record unemployment rate and the biggest decline in consumer prices in roughly 38 years.

Japan's Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications said the country's unemployment rate rose to 5.7% in July from 5.4% in the previous month.

The unemployment rate was higher than the 5.5% expected by economists, according to Dow Jones Newswires, and is the highest on record since World War II.
...
Meanwhile Japan's average monthly income per household fell 2.4% in nominal terms in July, while consumption expenditures fell 4.5% nominally ...

Japan's recession may be over, but I bet it doesn't feel like it to many workers.

by Calculated Risk on 8/27/2009 10:26:00 PM

From the WSJ: Recession Finally Hits Down on the Farm (ht Bob_in_MA)

The Agriculture Department forecast Thursday that U.S. farm profits will fall 38% this year, indicating that the slump is taking hold in rural America. ... The Agriculture Department said it expects net farm income -- a widely followed measure of profitability -- to drop to $54 billion in 2009, down $33.2 billion from last year's estimated net farm income of $87.2 billion, which was nearly a record high.

And from the Chicago Fed August AgLetter:

Farmland values for the second quarter of 2009 were 3 percent lower than a year ago in the Seventh Federal Reserve District. ... Almost 30 percent of the responding bankers expected farmland values to fall in the third quarter of 2009, whereas 71 percent expected stable farmland values.

This will probably mean lower food prices, from the WSJ:

For most Americans, the chill in the farm belt is related to one of the few positives they see in this economy: slowing inflation. Prices farmers are receiving for everything from corn and wheat to hogs are down sharply from last year.

by Calculated Risk on 8/27/2009 06:01:00 PM

A little history from Paul Kasriel, Chief Economist at Northern Trust: The Rhyming of History – Bloomberg and the RFC?

On November 7, 2008, Bloomberg LP sued the Federal Reserve Board under terms of the Freedom of Information Act to obtain the names of borrowers of funds from the Federal Reserve as well as lists of the collateral posted by the borrowers. On August 25, 2009, a U.S. District judge ruled in favor of Bloomberg, ordering the Federal Reserve Board to turn over to Bloomberg the requested information within five days. At this writing, the Fed has yet to comply and has yet made a decision to appeal the ruling.

CR Notes, from Bloomberg: The Fed has asked the Judge to stay the order until the U.S. Court of Appeals in New York can hear the case.

The Fed has been reluctant to reveal the names of its borrowers allegedly out of a concern that such a revelation could have an adverse competitive impact on the borrowers.

The reason I bring this up is that it is similar to a situation that arose in 1932 with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). The RFC was established by an act of Congress on January 22, 1932, for the purpose of making loans to financial institutions, railroads and to extend credit for crop loans. The Treasury provided some capital to the RFC and the RFC was permitted to borrow from the Treasury. Initially, the RFC granted credit primarily to banks. These loans coincided with a reduction in bank failures and currency held outside the banks declined.

On July 21, 1932, the RFC was authorized to make loans for self-liquidating public works projects, and to states to provide relief and work relief to needy and unemployed people. This legislation also required that the RFC report to Congress, on a monthly basis, the identity of all new borrowers of RFC funds. On orders from the Speaker of the House of Representatives, commencing in August 1932, the names of banks borrowing from the RFC became public information. This publication of the names of banks borrowing from the RFC discouraged current borrowers from continuing their borrowing and prospective borrowers from commencing borrowings out of a fear that depositors would judge this borrowing as a sign of financial weakness. By November 1932, the outstanding amount of RFC loans to banks had decreased.

In mid February of 1933, a Detroit bank began having difficulties. The RFC was willing to lend to this bank, but because of a dispute between one of the Michigan senators and Henry Ford, a large depositor in the bank, the RFC loan was not allowed to be made. A bank panic started in Michigan as a result. This Michigan bank panic served as a catalyst for a nationwide bank panic.

The failure of the Detroit bank was not because the bank was reluctant to borrow from the RFC. But one can only speculate as to whether other banks in Michigan and nationwide were reluctant to borrow from the RFC because their names would have been published. And one can only speculate that if these other banks had willing to borrow from the RFC if a nationwide bank could have been averted.

Today, we have federal deposit insurance. Therefore, the probabilities and magnitude of depositor runs on banks are much reduced compared with 1933. Yet, we can see “runs” by stockholders and other creditors of banks if there is a suspicion of financial problems. If the Fed is required to publish the names of financial institutions to which it has extended credit and this publication induces financial institutions to refrain from borrowing from the Fed, one can only speculate if this would be the tinder for another liquidity conflagration in the coming months.

Would we see another liquidity crisis because of concerns about the level of borrowing by certain banks from the Fed? I don't think so - but this is the concern. Doesn't everyone already suspect that Citi and BofA will be near the top of the list?

I suppose some second tier bank might have a problem if the data is disclosed.

by Calculated Risk on 8/27/2009 02:13:00 PM

From HotelNewsNow.com: STR reports US performance for week ending 22 August 2009

In year-over-year measurements, the industry’s occupancy fell 7.2 percent to end the week at 60.4 percent. Average daily rate dropped 10.2 percent to finish the week at US$95.70. Revenue per available room for the week decreased 16.7 percent to finish at US$57.84.

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

This graph shows the YoY change in the occupancy rate (3 week trailing average).

The three week average is off 7.3% from the same period in 2008.

The average daily rate is down 10.2%, and RevPAR is off 16.7% from the same week last year.

Comments: This is a multi-year slump. Although the occupancy rate was off 7.3 percent compared to last year, the occupancy rate is off over 11 percent compared to the same week in 2007.

The end of July through the beginning of August is usually the peak leisure travel period. So the peak occupancy rate for 2009 was probably a month ago at 67%. And that is far below normal.

Earlier this year business travel was off much more than leisure travel. So it was expected that the summer months would not be as weak as earlier in the year. September - after Labor Day (Sept 7th) - will be the real test for business travel, and for the hotel industry.

Data Source: Smith Travel Research, Courtesy of HotelNewsNow.com

by Calculated Risk on 8/27/2009 11:57:00 AM

From the Financial Times: ‘Cash-for-clunkers’ sales disappoint Detroit (ht James)

[S]igns are already emerging that overall sales will fall back sharply now that the incentives have expired.
...
[Edmunds.com] estimates that, based on visits to its websites, “purchase intent” is down 11 per cent from the average in June ...
excerpted with permission

It now appears that sales in August were at about a 16 million SAAR (auto sales for August will be released next week).

This follows an 11.22 million SAAR in July. The Cash-for-clunkers program started on July 24th.

If sales in September are 11% below June - that would put sales at under 9 million SAAR - the lowest sales for this cycle, and perhaps at the lowest rate since the early '70s. Of course the program just ended, but it will be interesting to see how much Cash-for-Clunkers cannibalized future sales.

by Calculated Risk on 8/27/2009 10:00:00 AM

The FDIC released the Q2 Quarterly Banking Profile today. The FDIC listed 416 banks with $299.8 billion in assets as “problem” banks in Q2, up from 305 banks with $220.0 billion in assets in Q1, and 252 and $159.4 billion in assets in Q4 2008.

Note: Not all problem banks will fail - and not all failures will be from the problem bank list - but this shows the problem is significant and still growing.

The Unofficial Problem Bank List shows 391 problem banks - and will probably increase this week.

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

This graph shows the number of FDIC insured "problem" banks since 1990.

The 416 problem banks reported at the end of Q2 is the highest since 1993.

There has been some concern that the FDIC has been slow to add banks to the problem list - and a number of failed banks were apparently never on the official list.

The second graph shows the assets of "problem" banks since 1990.

The assets of problem banks are the highest since 1993.

And the banking industry posted a net loss for the quarter:

Burdened by costs associated with rising levels of troubled loans and falling asset values, FDIC-insured commercial banks and savings institutions reported an aggregate net loss of $3.7 billion in the second quarter of 2009. Increased expenses for bad loans were chiefly responsible for the industry’s loss. Insured institutions added $66.9 billion in loan-loss provisions to their reserves during the quarter, an increase of $16.5 billion (32.8 percent) compared to the second quarter of 2008. Quarterly earnings were also adversely affected by writedowns of asset-backed commercial paper, and by higher assessments for deposit insurance.

On the Deposit Insurance Fund:

On June 30, 2009, a special assessment was imposed on all insured banks and thrifts. For 8,106 institutions, with assets of $9.3 trillion, the special assessment was 5 basis points of each institution’s assets minus Tier 1 capital; 89 other institutions, with assets of $4.0 trillion, had their special assessment capped at 10 basis points of their second quarter assessment base.

The Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) decreased by $2.6 billion (20.3 percent) during the second quarter to $10.4 billion (unaudited). Accrued assessment income from the regular and the special assessment increased the fund by $9.1 billion. Interest earned, combined with realized gains on securities and debt guarantee surcharges from the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program added $1.1 billion to the fund. Unrealized losses on available-for-sale securities combined with operating expenses reduced the fund by $1.3 billion.

The reduction in the DIF was primarily due to an $11.6 billion increase in loss provisions for bank failures. Twenty-four insured institutions with combined assets of $26.4 billion failed during the second quarter of 2009, the largest number of quarterly failures since the fourth quarter of 1992, when 42 insured institutions failed. For 2009 through the end of the second quarter, 45 insured institutions with combined assets of $35.9 billion failed at an estimated current cost to the DIF of $10.5 billion.

The DIF’s reserve ratio was 0.22 percent on June 30, 2009, down from 0.27 percent at March 31, 2009, and 1.01 percent one year ago. The June figure is the lowest reserve ratio for the combined bank and thrift insurance fund since March 31, 1993, when the reserve ratio was 0.06 percent.

by Calculated Risk on 8/27/2009 08:30:00 AM

The DOL reports weekly unemployment insurance claims decreased to 570,000:

In the week ending Aug. 22, the advance figure for seasonally adjusted initial claims was 570,000, a decrease of 10,000 from the previous week's revised figure of 580,000. The 4-week moving average was 566,250, a decrease of 4,750 from the previous week's revised average of 571,000.
...
The advance number for seasonally adjusted insured unemployment during the week ending Aug. 15 was 6,133,000, a decrease of 119,000 from the preceding week's revised level of 6,252,000.

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

This graph shows the 4-week moving average of weekly claims since 1971.

The four-week average of weekly unemployment claims decreased this week by 4,750 to 566,250, and is now 92,500 below the peak in April. It appears that initial weekly claims have peaked for this cycle.

The number of initial weekly claims is still very high (at 570,000), indicating significant weakness in the job market. The four-week average of initial weekly claims will probably have to fall below 400,000 before the total employment stops falling.

by Calculated Risk on 8/27/2009 12:16:00 AM

From Reuters: U.S. mortgage delinquencies up in July: Equifax

Among U.S. homeowners with mortgages, a record 7.32 percent were at least 30 days late on payments in July, up from about 4.5 percent a year earlier and 7.23 percent in June, according to monthly data from the Equifax credit bureau.

There numbers aren't directly comparable to the MBA quarterly numbers, but this shows that delinquencies are still rising.